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Foreword
This Working Paper is the executive summary of a collecti-
ve publication: Africa and its Demographic Challenges: an
Uncertain Future, edited by Benoît Ferry1. This study was
born out of a workshop on demography and population
issues organized in early March 2006 by the Agence
Française de Développement (AFD) in partnership with the
United Kingdom’s Department for International
Development (DFID), the Flora Hewlett Foundation and the
French Équilibres & Populations association. Given that
population issues seem to have been forgotten, or at least
put on the backburner of international agendas since the
1994 International Conference on Population and
Development (ICPD) in Cairo, this workshop’s initiators had
a threefold objective:
 to resituate the demography issue, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa, at the center of the debate on the struc-
tural factors of growth and development (or, to put it
more negatively, on the fundamental causes of the fai-
lure of policies aimed at combating poverty in certain
countries);
 to highlight the failure of the contraceptive revolution of
the last thirty years on the African continent and to
contrast the various viewpoints on the issue: resear-
chers from the South and the North, academics in the
French and English-speaking worlds, economists,
sociologists and demographers;
 to reignite renewed dialogue between the research
world and development actors on the complex relation-
ships between demographic, economic and political
problems.
The workshop’s organization was based on renewed deter-
mination to bridge the gap that too often still separates
scientists in research institutes from workers in the field.
This is an essential step in better understanding the suc-
cesses and failures of certain public policies, including
those recommended with the best of intentions by some
bilateral and multilateral donors, but whose desired short-
term effects seldom take contextual or historical determi-
nants into account. We need only take the example of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Since the New York
Summit in September 2000, they have become the alpha and
omega of international action for development. According to
François Egil, they are “a new millenium project”2, yet their
universality has no regard for the specific characteristics of
countries or their point of departure. The weight of the
demographic variable - which is set to triple or quadruple by
2050 in countries like Niger, Mali or Chad – will require
massive efforts to achieve the MDGs and to ensure univer-
sal enrolment, for example. For Africa, in particular, this
means going from 64 million children with primary educa-
tion today to 160 million in 2015. Consequently, new finan-
cial resources have to be mobilized, but it is even more
important to integrate a dynamic and forward-looking systemt
of school management (with heavy investment in real estate,
massive recruitment of teachers, etc.) and to provide a real
strategy for strengthening national capacities.
The very fact that collaboration on the demographic issue is
taking place is both exemplary and much needed. There
are several reasons for the international disinterest in these
issues since the 1994 ICPD and they point out how impor-
tant it is to return to them if Africa is not to continue lagging
behind in development.
1 Benoît Ferry (ed.)(2007), L’Afrique face à ses défis démographiques. Un avenir incertain,
AFD, CEPED, Karthala, Paris.
2 François Egil (2005), “Les éléphants de papier. Réflexions impies pour le Ve anniversaire
des Objectifs de Développement du Millénaire” (“Paper Tigers. Impious Thoughts on the 5th
Anniversary of the Millennium Development Goals”), Politique africaine, vol.99, pp. 97-115.
First of all, the stabilization of world population and the
acceleration of demographic transition have evaded the
gloomy predictions of the Club of Rome3 and have enabled
a few developing countries, including the most populated
(China, India, Thailand, etc.) to stint their growth. In addi-
tion, the “demographic bonus” from which those countries
benefited (the sudden fall in fertility during the transition
phase, leading to an increase in the active part of the popu-
lation and a decline in the inactive part), has greatly facilita-
ted their emergence in international economic relations
(production and consumption) so that they have now beco-
me full-fledged actors in globalization. Nevertheless, the
success of this world demographic transition has had draw-
backs: it conceals, overshadows or minimizes the African
discrepancy, particularly in West and Central Africa. High
African fertility has been spurred on by the combination of
two sometimes unconscious and contradictory ideologies:
one, inspired by nationalism, which sees population size as
synonymous with power (the essential objective for Africa
being to resume the relative position it held in the world
before the slave trade and the period of colonial exploita-
tion); the other, rooted in what we would call the
Antimalthusianism of some former colonial powers (France,
Portugal, etc.), according to which demographic growth is
above all else a benefit. If we exclude Tunisia, few African
heads of state have been able to escape the Manichean
trap and the stranglehold of these two ways of thinking. Nor
have they been able to protect the interests of their own
people or allow women to have access to family planning
(today, more than 130 million of them still have no access
to modern contraceptive methods) or to medical follow-up
for pregnancies. We can only be horrified by the following
statistic: an African woman is two hundred times more like-
ly to die during childbirth than a Western woman.
Secondly, the 1980s debt crisis and the implementation of
structural adjustment policies led to short-term problems
being prioritized, with the immediate goal of cleaning up
public finances, reducing public spending and completely
liberalizing economies (according to the then current cate-
chism of international financial institutions, formalized by
John Williamson in a series of principles that have become
famous under the name of the “Washington Consensus”).
In fact, these structural adjustment policies have largely led
to enriching ruling classes (often the frontline beneficiaries
of privatization policies) and the complete breakdown of
social structures in countries lacking political maturity. They
also had the effect of limiting already implemented actions
in favor of birth-control policies and, in many countries, hal-
ted progress made in reducing maternal and infant mortali-
ty. Moreover, the negative effects of what the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) has qualified as “a
lost decade of development“ have proved to be long-term.
Weakened states, incapable of providing any service to
their populations or of attracting non-clannish or non-mafia
skills, consequently find themselves completely delegitimi-
zed when trying to elaborate public policies. Another of the
harmful consequences of structural adjustment policies has
been that they reinforce the primacy of the economic ana-
lysis in development while “overlooking a number of other
dimensions (strategic, political, cultural, ethical...)“.4 In this
respect, it is striking to note that the widely practiced
research trend on aid effectiveness and on the optimal
conditions for its allocation (a trend which has been develo-
ping since the late 1990s in the wake of researchers and
economists linked to the World Bank, such as Burnside,
Dollar, Collier, etc.) is completely paralyzing the implemen-
tation of demographic policies. The World Bank’s African
Vice-Presidency currently has only one meager demogra-
pher on staff.
Thirdly, the emergence of new global challenges related to
the environment (global warming) or health (HIV/AIDS and
now Avian Flu) has mobilized international action on new
playing fields, while population issues are apparently no
longer so pressing on a global level. Although there is an
obvious link between population and environmental issues,
it is rarely made at the international level, despite the fact
that excessive population densities can have lasting adver-
se impacts on ecosystems: deforestation, impoverishment
of biodiversity and unregulated natural resource exploita-
tion. Even though migration is sometimes quoted as being
a regulatory factor, it can only be marginal in this context
(for the part of the population which has to migrate will
always remain small in the countries concerned, while the
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3 Meadows Report (1972), “Limits to Growth”,.
4 Jean-Michel Severino and Olivier Charnoz (2005), “État des lieux des politiques de dévelop-
pement : les mutations impromptues” (“Inventory of Development Policies: Sudden
Mutations”), Afrique contemporaine, No. 213, Winter.
capacity of receiving countries remains limited). It has spar-
ked a shift of imbalances or the creation of new ones: anar-
chic and unmanageable urban growth, the exacerbation of
conflicts surrounding land ownership between the indige-
nous and foreign-born population, the appearance of illegal
emigration channels into countries in the North, among
others.
If action in the fight against HIV/AIDS is analysed more pre-
cisely, it emerges that, in Africa, it rightly benefited from
priority support from donors, but to the detriment of more
wide-reaching healthcare programs, and even sometimes
of the general balance of healthcare systems. Although we
cannot deny that it was an attempt to avoid a total humani-
tarian catastrophe, particularly in the countries of Southern
Africa where the prevalence of HIV/AIDS has exceeded
30% (as in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland or Lesotho), to
the extent of grossly distorting the age pyramids and crea-
ting new social problems (the traumatic issue of HIV/AIDS
orphans obviously comes to mind). However, we must also
examine how this action has been adapted to countries less
affected by the disease, like Senegal or the Sahel coun-
tries, where prevalence does not go above 1% and should
not particularly increase in the years to come. In a study on
aid allocation by priority areas5, the OECD points out that
HIV/AIDS is receiving more resources than is justified by its
actual impact on morbidity and mortality. Of course, this
does not mean opposing the two priorities - the fight against
HIV/AIDS on the one hand and family planning on the other
- but one can ask whether the latter would not be better
seen by populations, women in particular.
Fourth and last, however improbable it may seem, the
alliance between the fundamentalist Christians and
Muslims (in the United States and Iran, for example) in
favor of limiting women’s rights and of opposing contracep-
tive programs, has certainly substantially contributed to
“neutralizing” the demographic problem in international
conferences. The priorities announced by donors (with the
exception of the unwavering Netherlands and some bilate-
ral donors from Scandinavia) have been weakened. France
has often found itself isolated when defending individual
rights, which have been severely threatened in this ideolo-
gical maelstrom. Even though the 1994 ICPD in Cairo
emphatically reaffirmed a certain number of rights concer-
ning “reproductive health”, these were not specifically resta-
ted in the 2000 Millennium Summit, even though the MDGs
obviously renewed commitments to fighting against mater-
nal and infant mortality, large pandemics (HIV/AIDS, tuber-
culosis and malaria) and inequality between the sexes.
Readers should also remember that the American volunta-
ry contribution to the United Nations Funds for Population
(UNFPA) was abruptly cut just after President Bush’s elec-
tion in 2000 under the official pretext that it lacked support,
however indirect, for birth control programs in China. In
addition, Paul Wolfowitz, during his short stay at the head
of the World Bank, opposed the bank’s approval of a fami-
ly planning program in Madagascar.
However, this lack of interest in population issues is not
sustainable in the medium and long term, something Jean-
Marie Bockel, Secretary of State for Cooperation and
Francophony, stressed on July 176 , adding that a large part
of Africa’s economic growth is automatically absorbed by
the demographic increase. His statement was clear: “It is
growth without development”. The stakes are too great to
be neglected in Sub-Saharan Africa where transition and
demographic trends are atypical. 5% of the world’s popula-
tion lives in about twenty countries where fertility is greater
than 6 children per woman. Although a highly relative drop
in the continent’s fertility rate has been noticed (5.4 children
per woman in 2002 versus 6.7 in 1985), demographic grow-
th projections are unsustainable in the long term, since they
range from doubling to quintupling, depending on the coun-
try (with the exception of South Africa). The record fertility
of a country like Niger (7 children per woman) remains
lower than the desire for children, which is 8 children for
women and 12 for men!
These trends put off to a distant future the dividends of the
demographic transition experienced by other parts of the
world (a transition that has often been the corollary to eco-
nomic take-off, as in Tunisia or Mexico). Furthermore, for
the poorest countries, they also raise certain insurmoun-
table problems in terms of arable land and agricultural
resources management (in Niger, the ratio of population to
cultivable land is today six times higher than it was when
Foreword
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5 OCDE, 2005, Working Paper, No. 244, June.
6 In his opening speech at the International Cooperation and Development Days. The entire
text is available at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr.
independence was declared in 1960), water supply, school
and healthcare center construction, the fight against pover-
ty and social inequalities (since statistically the poor have
more children, they are relatively more numerous).
Consequences of this demographic growth include the pro-
bable increase in food shortages and famines (particularly
in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa), the development of
both rural (for land ownership and exploitation) and urban
(with the massive presence of unemployed youth) conflicts
and, of course, the rise of increasingly uncontrollable migra-
tory flows towards urban areas and richer regions, and
finally towards Europe, in a movement of communicating
vessels. All development efforts and the success achieved
here and there (such as the success of the cotton industry
in French West Africa) may be undone if no new efforts are
made.
Before acting, we obviously need to better understand the
phenomena at stake and the dynamics within which they
are being played out. Only by solidly grasping the reality
(and that is really the true purpose of the project launched
in March 2006 by the different partners in this initiative) can
an effective influence be exerted on the kinds of policies to
be implemented. We must, as Ruth Levine, Director of
Programs for the Center for Global Development, neatly
and clearly puts it, “shed more light where there is only a
glimmer”7. The first priority is therefore to revive research
programs and projects in order to better understand present
demographic trends and to better explain their economic
and social determinants. In this regard, France has an outs-
tanding research institution, the Centre Population et
Développement (CEPED), whose work deserves to be pro-
moted nationally (a goal of this publication) and internatio-
nally, considering its real ability to mobilize African scientific
expertise, which has suffered a great deal from the collap-
se of funding allocated to them in both French-speaking
and English-speaking countries. Because they lack viable
statistical information (this applies to the economic sector
just as much as to the demographic one), governments and
donors make up imaginary worlds that are increasingly
removed from the objective reality. You do not have to go to
Second Life to discover new worlds: reading some interna-
tional organizations’ reports, including those reputed to be
the most serious such as the Bretton Woods Institutions,
will do just as well!
It must also be pointed out that since 1998, AFD, a bilateral
operator and the mainspring of French public aid for deve-
lopment, is running many projects in the healthcare sector
and even more in the educational one, the development of
which necessarily depends on a very subtle understanding
of the demographic development of the countries in ques-
tion. In education, AFD is prioritizing the fight against pover-
ty and inequalities by promoting access to quality education
for all. The improvement in girls’ enrolment rates in particu-
lar should help improve living conditions, optimize human
resources and, eventually, lead to demographic transition.
As for improving infant healthcare services, AFD aims to
strengthen healthcare systems as a whole via global inter-
ventions using either support for specific areas or broad-
reaching projects. In addition, it brings more regular support
to certain target countries in the technical aspects of vacci-
nation policy. In the area of maternal health, the priorities
translate into projects dealing with both supply and demand
for quality healthcare, particularly by improving financial,
social and cultural accessibility to reproductive health ser-
vices. The intended impact is threefold: improve women’s
rights (particularly concerning their sexuality), reduce
maternal mortality and morbidity, and regulate population
growth.
If its multilateral commitment is also taken into account
(particularly in the financing of The Global Fund to fight
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria), France’s efforts have focu-
sed more globally on the fight against HIV/AIDS and conta-
gious diseases (the sixth of the eight MDGs). This heavy
mobilization reflects a long-standing commitment, at the
highest political levels to provide access to medicines for
the sick within developing countries. Thus France has
played a key role in getting the G8 to recognize the need for
global action combining prevention, detection, access to
medicine and healthcare and to community management.
On the other hand, France has been less involved in the
MDGs for reducing infant and maternal mortality. In respon-
se to this, the recent strategic orientations of French aid aim
to significantly increase France’s interventions in those
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7 Équilibres & Populations, 2006, Newsletter, No. 97-98, January-June.
areas, in particular through integrated support for childhood
diseases (mainly via vaccination) and by improving repro-
ductive health, pregnancy follow-up and the conditions for
giving birth.
Based on the conclusions reached by this publication’s
research, revamping a broad action plan needs to occur. It
should be elaborated around the following areas:
 taking into account, in all sector-based policies (educa-
tion, health, rural development, urban development, the
environment, etc.), the demographic challenge so as to
better define populations’ needs, on the one hand, and
on the other, to act early to promote awareness. In
effect, it is crucial for population issues, as for all other
development issues, that recipient countries appropria-
te the implemented policies. If a local participant is not
convinced of a program’s relevance, it has very little
hope of succeeding, hence the importance that local
specificities (culture, religion, gender, promotion of the-
matic knowledge, etc.) be taken into account. This also
relates to the concern, which is not necessarily syste-
matic, of promoting certain methods, experienced as
being imposed from the outside (repeating the “success
stories” of some, often creates the nightmares of
others), but to create a debate around them;
 reaffirming the belief that access to reproductive health
is a right of all men and particularly of all women. Again,
the aim here is not to force African families to have
fewer children, but to give them the possibility of choo-
sing the number of children they have, in conditions that
do not endanger the life of the mother. All studies show
that reducing the number of pregnancies in a woman’s
lifetime can improve maternal health and reduce infant
mortality;
 developing, particularly in West and Central Africa, heal-
thcare programs that do not exclusively focus on the
problem of HIV/AIDS (without of course forgetting it),
but that also address, via an integrated approach, other
causes of infant mortality (malaria, diarrheic diseases,
respiratory infections, etc.);
 choosing an approach, which is more crucial than ever,
based on strengthening healthcare systems and inte-
grating reproductive health, infant and maternal health-
care, the fight against HIV/AIDS and general healthcare
into a common framework. Bilateral cooperation
through technical assistance and capacity reinforce-
ment programs has a fundamental and unique role,
which effectively complements the actions of so-called
vertical funds (like The Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuber-
culosis and malaria).
This commitment taken by all French cooperation, suppor-
ted by research institutes and centers such as CEPED,
INED or IRD, must be continued in the years to come. The
most recent speeches by key leaders in France testify to a
genuine awareness of the issues discussed here. “The
[demographic] challenge is therefore huge and each and
every one of us must understand its full extent”, stressed
the Secretary of State for Cooperation and Francophony,
Jean-Marie Bockel8. As put by AFD’s Director-General,
Jean-Michel Severino during the workshop that was the
springboard of this publication, the demographic issue is “a
crucial area for the future of Africa [...] that is profoundly tied
to all development aid and support policies for Africa.” It
would also be useful that actions take place at the
European level with the main donors involved – the
Germans, the British and the Dutch, in particular, whose
analyses often mirror our own–in order to guarantee strong
and sustainable actions in these areas. Finally, the
European Commission, via its cooperation agency Europe
Aid, has a key role to play in this area, a role it has not
always assumed. The issues at stake are crucial. The aid
agencies’ commitment must be unwavering in order to
effectively support the efforts of partner countries.
Jean-Marc Châtaigner
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Executive Summary: Demography, Reproductive Health and Development
in Sub-Saharan Africa
According to United Nations population projections publi-
shed in 2007, the world’s population is expected to increa-
se by 50% in the next fifty years, rising from 6.1 billion in
2000 to 9.2 billion in 2050. During this same period, the
population of Sub-Saharan Africa could be multiplied by
2.6, rising from 680 million in 2000 to 1,760 billion in 2050
(United Nations, 2007a). Should we still be sticking to the
hypothesis that worldwide demographic patterns are level-
ling out and that mortality and fertility rates in African coun-
tries are dropping off? Given the recent trends in some of
these countries, the answer is probably no. In effect,
figures show that population growth in Africa remains
exceptionally high. The demographic situation in Sub-
Saharan Africa has been further complicated by the emer-
gence of HIV/AIDS, and some countries are now even wit-
nessing a rise in mortality as well as reversals in the trend
of falling fertility previously thought to be irreversible and
permanent. In fact, no matter which demographic forecast
we use one thing is sure: population growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa will be one of the critical issues of the 21st century
due to the expected demographic impact of its upcoming
child-bearing generations (United Nations, 2007b). The
future of the region hence greatly depends on the effect this
demographic growth will have on economic and social
development, and on populations’ living conditions.
The economic performance of a country depends on a
variety of factors that are complex and deeply rooted in the
past. One factor, which interacts with a host of others, is
demographic behavior. In the modern era, during the early
stages of demographic transition, the development of
European countries was galvanized by population growth.
This growth, however, was relatively moderate and well
managed by these countries (which are rich today), thanks
to changes in mentality and social structures, the imple-
mentation of adequate policies and adapted institutions
(Demeny and McNicoll, 2006), and also massive overseas
emigration (Chesnais,1986). Unlike this development
model, Sub-Saharan Africa has not experienced any real
economic take-off. This region has been unable to use its
demographic growth to foster economic growth, inspite of
its considerable assets: human resources, rich mineral
resources as well as agricultural and forest resources.
Unfortunately, these are most often poorly exploited or
undeveloped.
Unlike emerging Asian and South American countries,
many Sub-Sahara African countries are still experiencing
weak economic growth and an uncontrolled population
boom. Most have yet to put themselves firmly on the path
towards development and hence remain on the margins of
the ongoing globalization movement. Although there were
encouraging signs of progress during the decade after inde-
pendance, per capita income in this region has barely
increased since the 1970s9. While the recent economic
improvements have led some institutions like the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African
Union to more optimistic conclusions, major factors of insta-
bility persist: oil revenue dependence in most countries
with strong growth, high occurrence of political instability
and military conflicts, ineffectiveness of public authorities,
among others. In fact, recent cases of GNP rise should be
taken with a grain of salt as this indicator is far from perfect.
For some countries, such a rise might simply result from an
Between a Contrasted Present and an Uncertain Future
9 Thirty years ago, average per capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa was twice that of East
Asia. Today, it is well below half. This downward trend is comparable with the world’s other
developing regions.
increase in oil or mining revenues, or a good harvest due to
improved climate conditions. Moreover, questions of inco-
me inequalities, living standards, national wealth, or social
conflict do not figure into the picture painted by GDP levels,
an indicator that also overlooks mineral resource depletion,
a booming black market, and, the informal sector, which
often generates more of the GNP than the formal sector.
Put simply, while an increase in per capita income may indi-
cate short-term economic growth, it is not necessarily indi-
cative of sustainable development, which is the key ele-
ment to ensuring better living conditions for populations and
upcoming generations in a foreseeable future.
The question still remains as to whether or not present
achievements are enough to effectively curb poverty. In
2004, only six countries reached the growth rate of at least
7% required to achieve the First Millenium Development
Goal (cut poverty in half by 2015): Chad, Equatorial Guinea,
Liberia, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. Among these
six countries, only Chad, Equatorial Guinea and
Mozambique have maintained such a growth rate since
2001, and Angola since 2002 (CEA, 2005). While the pro-
portion of the Sub-Sahara African population living in extre-
me poverty (with less than one dollar a day), has changed
little between 1990 and 2002 (from 44.6% to 44%), the
actual number of people living in such poverty has risen by
140 million (United Nations, 2006a).
In addition to the overall economic marginalization of Sub-
Saharan Africa, there are some striking inequalities bet-
ween the countries and these tend to worsen with globali-
zation. Those countries that have been experiencing sustai-
ned growth since their independence with a more or less
stable and functional democracy, good governance and a
sense of national identity over the years, are in a better
position to assume a role in the international economy and
to take full advantage of public development assistance and
changing technologies (Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana, Benin
and South Africa). Inversely, among countries with weak,
stagnate or negative GNP growth since independence,
many have endured civil wars or political instability leaving
them with highly ineffective public infrastructures, healthca-
re services and educational facilities, which are sometimes
even completely lacking in parts of the country (Ivory Coast,
Nigeria and the Congo, without overlooking countries that
have remained failed states for many years now, as is the
case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Somalia). All these countries have limited means to exploit
the opportunities offered by globalization and often have to
face its negative consequences such as drug and arms traf-
ficking, and the black market which operates outside of
state control. In an increasingly globalized economy, vir-
tuous cycles have become full-blown vicious circles. If
countries of Sub-Sahara African are to curb this trend in the
future, they will need to boost their capacity to obtain and
manage investments, as well as development and humani-
tarian assistance from the outside world (Clapham, 2006;
National Intelligence Council, 2005)10.
Not only is Sub-Saharan Africa the least advanced region in
terms of development, it is also the most behind in terms of
demographic transition. From an economic and social
standpoint, Sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest per capita
income of all the major developing regions in 2004:
US$1,946 (in purchasing power parity), or, two-thirds of that
of South Asia (US$3,072), the next least endowed region.
Its human development index is 0.472 versus 0.599 for
South Asia. In the area of education, Sub-Saharan Africa is
virtually at a tie with South Asia: 63% literacy rate among
adults versus 61% in the latter, but the region is still well
behind Arab countries (70%) and even farther behind East
Asian and South American countries (90%) (UNDP, 2006).
In terms of demography, annual population growth in
Sub-Saharan Africa has been and will remain the highest
in the world. United Nations estimates indicate a growth
rate of at least 2.5% per year between the 1960-1965 and
the 2000-2005 periods. For the 2010-2015 period, the pro-
jected rate is 2.3%. This exceptionally high and persistent
Executive Summary: Demography, Reproductive Health and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
© AFD Working Paper N°62 • Africa and its Demographic Challenges: an Uncertain Future
10
10 Table 1 in appendix 1 on economic and population growth trends of Sub-Sahara African
countries shows a significant variation in economic growth between the countries, with little
homogeneity within sub-regions. Countries in Southern Africa are experiencing low economic
and population growth rates. The latter is however attributed both to the impact of AIDS on
mortality and to a falling birth rate. Economic growth in East Africa varies significantly from
one country to the other with population growth throughout the region generally falling by 2 -
2.9%. In Central Africa, economic growth primarily depends on petroleum revenues, and
population growth here is highly variable. The economic growth of West African countries is
sustained apart from countries that have recently experienced conflicts (Ivory Coast, Guinea-
Conakry and Liberia). Population growth is variable here.
population growth is, ironically, accompanied by high mor-
tality. For the 2000-2005 period, life expectancy at birth in
Sub-Saharan Africa remained 14 years lower than in
South Asia: 48.8 years versus 62.711. In addition, life
expectancy has barely risen since the late 1980s, due
mainly to the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It fell from
49.9 years in 1985-1990 to 48.8 years in the 2000-2005
period, and is expected to hit 50 years in the 2005-2010
period, or 10 years later than what would have been the
case had the HIV/AIDS epidemic not occurred (United
Nations, 2007a).
To better understand this critical situation marked by under-
development, poverty and high population growth, we
opted to focus on the issues we consider as critical at this
stage of our scientific reflection. Above all, this collective
work aims to underline the major demographic trends of
Africa as we enter the 21st century while emphasizing his-
torical and demographic perspectives, and current fertility
and mortality trends. It then turns to the relationship bet-
ween population and development by paying particular
attention to the demand for children, the interactions bet-
ween poverty and fertility, as well as to the role of education
and healthcare in achieving sustainable economic growth.
The last section of this composite book addresses potential
means of action by focusing on the sexual and reproducti-
ve behavior of youth as well as on their access to reproduc-
tive healthcare.
This synthesis is based on the various contributions to this
composite book and attempts to point out the major rela-
tionships between population issues (including reproductive
health) and economic growth while taking into account the
relationships that exist between population dynamics and
the sectors involved in social development: economy, heal-
thcare and education. It also seeks to pinpoint the priority
areas of action as well as the research priorities identified
by the various contributors.12
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11 Recent WHO projections show that differences in life expectancy will continue widening bet-
ween Sub-Saharan Africa and the other regions of the world. It is expected that by 2030, its
life expectancy at birth for men and women will be somewhere between 50 and 55 years while
for the other regions of the world it will be above 65 years (Mathers and Loncar, 2006).
12 I express my gratitude to Benoît Ferry, Jean-Pierre Guengant, Philippe Hugon and
Dominique Tabutin for their remarks all along the writing of this synthesis.
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1. The Population Issue in Sub-Saharan Africa
The demography of Africa is unique due to its historical
heritage and its current trends (cf. Chapter 1). It has
always been a major factor in the continent’s history
(Clapham, 2006: 98). Some scholars even see population
as the key factor of this history, and have uncovered many
distinctive characteristics of this demographic process
that have been recurrent over the centuries (Iliffe, 1995,
cited by Clapham, 2006). Without going into details, it
goes without saying that the history of Africa was drama-
tically affected by the slave trade and colonialism. In 1900,
by which time the slave trade was nearly over, Sub-
Saharan Africa had a population of some 100 million with
a low population density, which had changed little in the
four previous centuries (about 2 persons per square kilo-
meter in 1500 versus slightly more than 4 persons per
square kilometer in 1900), and was then unequally distri-
buted. High population density was confined to a few iso-
lated regions: Ethiopian Plateau, Great Lakes region,
West African forest zone stretching from present day
Southern Ghana to Nigeria, and a few others. Starting in
the 1920s, however, population growth took off following
the end of the slave trade, the development of colonial
administrations and communication routes, and the intro-
duction of Western medicine (Herbst, 2000 and Iliffe,
1995, cited by Clapham, 2006). However, the overall den-
sity in 1950, a few years before independence, was still
generally low (slightly more than 7 inhabitants per square
kilometer). The population was then estimated at a
meagre 168 million, which was not conducive to develo-
ping human activities and building organized and effective
states.
Many decades later in 2005, the population of Sub-Saharan
Africa was estimated at 770 million, or 4.3 times what it was
in 1950. This resulted from an annual growth rate that was
equal to, or above, 2.5% since 1960 (United Nations,
2007a). This population growth rate, the highest in the
world for the past 50 years, caused the proportion of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s population in the world’s population to vir-
tually double during the 20th century (rising from 6% to
11%). This occurred during the initial stages of demogra-
phic transition and was generated by declining mortality
coupled with high fertility, and clearly sets Sub-Saharan
Africa apart from other developing regions (United Nations
2003; United Nations, 2005).
1.1 Low Overall Density and High Population Growth
1.2 A belated drop in mortality that is currently slowing down or stopping
Sub-Saharan Africa has joined the world’s downward trend
in mortality (cf. Chapters 1 and 2). This trend began in
North-West Europe in the 18th century after the region
found ways to overcome major epidemics and food shor-
tages and continued into the 19th century throughout the
rest of Europe, North America and Japan. In the 20th cen-
tury, the trend spread to South America, Asia, the Middle
East and finally, though late, to Sub-Saharan Africa. In this
region, the fall in mortality did not become fully established
until the second half of the 20th century and it occurred at
a relatively slow pace. Today, the main indicators of the
region’s mortality (a crude death rate of 16%, a life expec-
tancy at birth of 48.8 years and a child mortality rate of
167%) (United Nations, 2007a) are comparable with the
levels reached in 1900 by the more advanced countries of
the time (England, France, Japan). In concrete terms, Sub-
Sahara African countries are among those with the highest
mortality in the world and hardly reap the benefits of
advances made in the healthcare sector in other regions of
the world, especially in dealing with infectious diseases and
malaria, and are the most affected by the HIV/AIDS pande-
mic (Mesle and Vallin, 1997; United Nations, 2006b).
Child mortality, like overall mortality, did not really begin fal-
ling until the 1950s13. This downward trend occurred throu-
ghout the entire region and was due mainly to an overall
improvement in living standards and nutrition as well as to
the organization of immunization campaigns. This fall,
however, did not occur at the same rates in all countries
due to highly variable child mortality rates and marked dif-
ferences between countries of East and Southern Africa
(where the fall in mortality was more significant) and the
countries of West and Central Africa. From the 1980s
onwards, these differences became less obvious, and in
some countries mortality actually rose following the out-
break of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, with Southern Africa and
some countries of East Africa being some of the most affec-
ted areas. While there are differences among countries,
mortality discrepancies are also present along the lines of
social categories, education levels and area of residence,
with the lowest levels of child mortality being linked to urba-
nization and education (Hill, 1996).
When adult mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa began dropping
off in the early 1950s, it was already much higher than in
the rest of the world. The drop was relatively steep during
the 1960s and 1970s and outpaced the fall in child mortali-
ty. Here too, there were major differences between coun-
tries, regions and on the basis of socioeconomic status.
This downward trend slowed significantly in the 1980s and
1990s with the rise of socioeconomic crises, numerous
local or regional conflicts14 and the emergence of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic (Timæus, 1996).
Early on in this trend, a definitive decline in mortality see-
med well underway. In fact, life expectancy at birth rose
from 37.6 years to 49.6 years between the 1950-1955 and
1990-1995 periods. But then life expectancy at birth drop-
ped off to only 48.8 years in the 2000-2005 period (United
Nations, 2007a). While West Africa, Central Africa and East
Africa all experienced a slow-down in falling mortality, in
Southern Africa the mortality actually rose: life expectancy
at birth fell by 10 years from 62 years in 1990-1995 to 52
years in the 2000-2005 period. Such trend reversals, pre-
viously unheard of except in cases of war and famine, can-
not be considered as incidental epiphenomena. On the
contrary, they must be interpreted as long-term phenomena
with structural causes (Moser et al. 2005). The effected
countries are varied and include: South Africa, Botswana,
Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Namibia, Tanzania, Togo and
Zimbabwe. With this new rise in mortality, the slow-going
progress made from the outset of falling mortality was lost.
Thus, in three countries (Zimbabwe, Zambia and
Botswana) life expectancy at birth in 2000-2005 was lower
than what it was in the 1950-1955 period. In six other coun-
tries (Lesotho, Swaziland, Rwanda, Liberia, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Ivory Coast), life expectancy at
birth in the 2000-2005 period was only 3 to 6 years higher
than in the 1950-1955 period (United Nations, 2007a).
Of course, AIDS has had a major impact on this crisis and
the health catastrophe in some Sub-Sahara African coun-
tries, particularly those in Southern Africa and East Africa.
But there are other phenomena involved as well: emergent
and resurgent diseases (including tuberculosis, often
HIV/AIDS related, drug-resistant malaria, and cholera);
economic and food crises; the rise in poverty and inequali-
ties; civil conflicts or wars between countries; state disorga-
nization; rising health costs for households; and the ineffec-
tiveness of healthcare systems. All these factors interact
with one another in patterns that are rather poorly unders-
tood. While the health transition started well in the African
continent as a whole, the process has now reversed (more
or less for the long run) in many countries, especially those
most affected by AIDS.
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13 With the exception of a few places before the Second World War, in Ghana particularly and
in Togo.
14 Four million people died either directly or indirectly from the war that wrought apart the
Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1998 and 2004. This war turned out to be the
worst humanitarian crisis and the world’s deadliest conflict since the Second World War
(Coghlan et al.., 2006). Coined “Africa’s First World War”, it involved eight States and is
ongoing in a rather endemic manner adding its fair share of deaths and refugees to the tolls
from other conflicts in Darfur and Somalia which threaten to destabilize the Central African
region and the Horn of Africa.
Populations of Sub-Saharan Africa have the highest fertility
in the world by far (cf. Chapter 1). From an average of near-
ly 7 children per woman in the 1950s to the 1970s, the fer-
tility rate began dropping during the 1980s and was down to
6.1 children per women in the 1990-1995 period, and drop-
ped even further to 5.5 children per woman in the 2000-
2005 period. The fall in fertility started much later compared
to the other regions of the world and is continuing at
variable rates from one country to the next. With a high pre-
transitional and relatively homogenous fertility rate of 6 to 8
children per woman in the 1960s, excepting a few countries
strongly affected by sterility (Gabon, for instance), the drop-
off in fertility was sharp in Southern Africa, in some insular
countries and in Zimbabwe. It was much slower in twenty
other countries where it dropped by 1 to less than 2 children
per woman between the 1980-1985 and the 2000-2005 per-
iods. The fertility transition remains slow or has not even
begun in some fifteen other countries, for the most part in
West Africa and in Central Africa. In addition, the fall in fer-
tility remains highly variable depending on population cate-
gory: it is much slower among rural and poorly educated
populations (Tabutin and Schoumaker, 2004).
The fall in fertility has been late, slow and uneven in Sub-
Saharan Africa, as has been the case of contraceptive use,
which is also highly variable. In fact, from the most recent
available data, use of total contraception (excluding breast
feeding) varies from a figure of 3 to 6% in four countries
(Chad, Niger, Angola, and Erithrea) to more than 50% in
three countries (Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Mauritius).
Use of modern contraception varies from a figure of 2 to 5%
in six countries (including Chad, Niger, Angola, Erithrea,
Mauritania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) to
more than 50% in two countries (Zimbabwe and South
Africa). These differences are attributed to divergent but
generally slow trends in contraceptive practices. The cases
of Asian and South American countries indicate that fertility
control can be attained in about fifty years if contraceptive
use progresses by about 1.5 percentage points per year
until it reaches 70% of married women. Data available on
Sub-Saharan Africa show that use of modern methods for
periods of at least 10 years has progressed by at least 1.5
points per year in only four countries: Zimbabwe,
Swaziland, Zambia and Malawi. For the 14 West African
and Central African countries for which such long-term data
is available, the progress in the use of modern contracep-
tion has been atmost 0.6 percentage point per year in
Ghana (between 1976 and 2003) and 0.5 percentage point
in Cameroon (1978-2004). In the other countries, it has
been less than 0.5 percentage point a year. This indicates
that if this pace continues, their fertility transition could take
at least one hundred years. Clearly, the growth in contra-
ceptive use is also very low in the majority of countries for
which no data on trends is available. Overall, low contra-
ceptive use and the low rate of progression here, is not only
of concern to landlocked and very poor countries, such as
countries of the Sahel region or countries previously and
presently faced with internal or external conflicts. Even in
the continent’s model countries (Cameroon, Nigeria,
Senegal, etc.) widespread contraceptive use has hardly
taken off (Vimard and Fassassi, 2005).
Sub-Saharan Africa is still far from joining the contraceptive
revolution that has occurred in other developing regions.
Moreover, contraceptive use varies greatly not only from
one country to the other but also within countries depending
on area of residence and social group. This high variability
constitutes an additional source of inequality between
populations as some groups are quite capable, to some
extent, of controlling the reproduction of their population
whereas others simply cannot. Fall in fertility will depend
more and more on the complementarity of various prac-
tices: modern contraception, traditional methods of birth
spacing (postpartum abstinence and prolonged breast-fee-
ding inducing postpartum amenorrhea), a rise in the age of
first marriage, and abortions, which are increasingly com-
mon in towns. It has even been estimated that at the begin-
ning stage of this fertility transition, for some urban popula-
tions, abortion could reduce fertility just as much as contra-
ceptive use has (Fassassi and Vimard, 2002; Guillaume,
2003). This situation reveals the difficulties faced by many
members of the population in getting access to contracep-
tive measures. Such obstacles are not only cultural, they
are also economic and institutional, and might simply be
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1.3 High Fertility: A Slow and Uneven Transition
due to a complete lack of contraceptive services. Abortion,
often performed in secret, is a threat to women’s health and
can reduce their future fertility and even threaten their lives.
In fact, a large part of maternal deaths are attributed to
abortions carried out under poor conditions (Guillaume,
2000).
We have also noticed that the falling fertility trend is far
more unpredictable than was thought some 10 years ago.
In effect, in two Sub-Sahara African countries, Ghana and
Kenya - which are model countries due to their early formu-
lation of population policies in the 1960s leading to a rapid
drop in their fertility -, falling fertility has halted while contra-
ceptive use is on the rise. This stabilization of fertility in the
course of the transition, which is far from over (the average
number of children per woman is 4.4 in Ghana and 4.7 in
Kenya), is different from what occurred in industrialized
countries and many other countries of the South, and
demonstrates that falling fertility is neither inevitable nor
irreversible. The observed interruption is certainly linked to
a common system of closely related factors: stabilization of
desired family size, demand for contraception, and contra-
ception practices. It is also associated with a whole range
of more distant factors, including the stagnation or decline
in socioeconomic development, in education and in child
mortality (Bongaarts, 2006). The present situation does not,
however, provide indications as to mid and long-term trends
given that the stagnations observed are relatively recent.
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2. Demography and Economic/Social Underdevelopment: Varying
Poverty Levels and Reversible Progress
Recent studies indicate that poverty is a factor of over-
mortality and high fertility. This is particularly the case in
Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2006; Rutstein and Johnson,
2004). In other words, the difficulties faced by African
populations, whether in terms of monetary poverty15 or
living conditions poverty,16 keep them from effectively
limiting procreation and fighting against diseases. It is not
entirely surprising that a region which has experienced a
drop in its per capita income during the previous decades
(-1.1% in the 1980s and -0.2% in the 1990s, at annual
growth rates) has a less advanced demographic transi-
tion despite the considerable economic progress in the
2000s with an annual increase in per capita income of
+1.6% (World Bank, 2006). On the whole, health pro-
grams and family planning policies have been poorly
implemented in the entire region.
2.1 Development, Poverty and Fertility
In the area of fertility, various summary studies, particularly
those done since 1995, generally confirm the relative fall in
fertility in the various countries and marked differences bet-
ween regions, areas of residence and socioeconomic
groups. They also throw light on the relationship between
poverty, demand for children and fertility, which is crucial in
understanding the factors which account for the trend (cf.
Chapters 4 and 5). From a world perspective and at a
macro level, countries having witnessed the most preco-
cious and steepest fall in fertility between the 1960s and
1990s are those which are most advanced in economic,
education and health areas, rank high in terms of human
development, and are less landlocked. Sub-Saharan Africa
mirrors this classical model of the fertility transition (Cohen,
1998; Tabutin, 1997). However, only three countries
(Mauritius, Réunion, which is a French dependency, and
South Africa) witnessed precocious and relatively rapid fer-
tility transitions. From a more precise regional perspective,
spatial analyses generally confirm the importance in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and elsewhere, of factors related to socioe-
conomic development in accounting for falling fertility.
Among the “explanatory” variables that account for diffe-
rences in fertility between regions, healthcare development
is by far the most significant, followed by economic deve-
lopment and educational development, and then urbaniza-
tion (Tabutin and Schoumaker, 2001). At the micro level, the
level of families and individuals, most if not all studies agree
on the key factors affecting fertility and use of contracep-
tives: the mother’s level of education and even the father’s
level of education, as well as households’ standards of
living (Schoumaker, 2004; Vimard et al., 2007). Up to the
1990s, the fall in fertility observed in some groups and
areas was mainly attributed to education, urbanization and
improvements in living standards. However, poverty
remains a key factor in fertility as poor populations tend to
have high demands for children with little access to informa-
tion and effective contraceptive methods for regulating pro-
creation (Tabutin and Schoumaker, 2004).
15 Nearly half of the population survives on an income of less than one dollar per day (UNDP,
2006).
16 38% of infants aged 12-23 months are not immunized against yellow fever, 36% of children
do not receive primary education, 54% of women deliver without any professional assistance
and 31% of the population still suffers from hunger (UNDP, 2006).
In fact, poverty-stricken populations strive for and are
having many children as a strategy to escape poverty,
improve their present circumstances, attenuate their fragile
situations and secure their future. In national or local
contexts where crises and economic insecurity tend to be
recurrent, having many children is simply a rational beha-
vior for households. As a family survival strategy, it has
more advantages than weaknesses. For poor and destitute
social groups, in terms of human and social capital, children
are a source of instant income, old-age insurance, enabling
diversification of activities and minimization of financial and
economic risks. In addition, children are a source of presti-
ge and a symbol of social success, and ensure the social
group’s posterity. Having children is quite inexpensive and
as long as infant mortality remains high this demand corres-
ponds to a real need for insurance and child replacement
(cf. Chapter 5).
Of course, it is difficult to determine how the upcoming
decades will turn out. With various parts of the region laden
with HIV/AIDS, endemic conflicts and urbanization without
industrialization, previous patterns of fertility transition could
well be modified. In the case of African cities, “poverty mal-
thusianism” might well occur – a process whereby the most
underprivileged social classes faced with difficulties and
high costs of living (housing, education, and healthcare in
particular) begin limiting the number of children they have.
In this respect, it is also necessary to take into acount the
individualization of economic, social and family behaviors,
and the progressive abandoning of traditional beliefs
encouraging high fertility. This individualization of behavior
could lead to the breakdown of family solidarity especially in
situations of recurrent economic and social crises. Such
disintegration is observed today in African cities with a rise
in the number of street children. It is still doubtful whether
the fertility transition of the poor can be achieved without
effective contraceptive methods that are accessible and
culturally and socially acceptable, particularly with respect
to gender.
In most cases, the implementation of family planning pro-
grams in the region’s various countries has started late.
Moreover, such programs hardly benefit from the long-term
support of governments and political authorities. The efforts
made are often fragmented and hinge upon the instant sup-
port provided by non-profit organizations, bilateral donor
agencies and multilateral donors. In such a context, it is not
surprising that the availability of contraceptive methods in
Sub-Saharan Africa is much lower compared to other conti-
nents. This is particularly the case in Francophone Africa,
which is very much lacking in this area although in terms of
policies, services and activities evaluation, it is on more or
less equal footing with other developing regions (Ross and
Stover, 2001).
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2.2 Education, Health, Population Growth and Development
Education and health play decisive roles in limiting popula-
tion growth and in spurring development. Human capital is
more and more critical in the new information and knowled-
ge economy where priority is placed on skills and capabili-
ties (Sen, 1999). The educational and healthcare systems
of African societies are highly different in terms of organiza-
tion and results, and the number of crises and the extent of
brain drain to the West has tended to jeopardize the pro-
gress made. While there is significant increase in school
enrollment, and improvement in health status and mortality,
the goals of education and health for all remain utopic
objectives in the majority of Sub-Sahara African countries
(cf. Chapter 3).
High population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa makes it dif-
ficult to generalize education, hence the high number of
uneducated women getting married precociously, bearing
many children and making poor use of healthcare systems.
Inversely, the considerable effort made by some East
African and Southern African countries in education during
a period of high population growth ended up raising the age
of marriage, reducing fertility and improving health status.
Having fewer children makes it easier for progress to be
made in education and hence in employment, thereby
engendering a virtuous cycle.
Obtaining formal education is an effective way of breaking
the vicious cycle of intergenerational poverty transfer as
parents level of education is a key factor in the demand for
education for children and in the reduction of gender dispa-
rities. Education is equally a development catalyst in that it
reinforces the factors of economic growth such as innova-
tion, and a spirit of experimentation and science. Likewise,
the healthcare sector is key to maintaining a high quality
workforce. Better health status and success in education
are key factors for improving the quality of human
resources and increasing productivity (Behrman, 1996).
However, the interdependence of education, health, popu-
lation and development is based on the nature of the actual
productive system. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the dominant
economic dynamic is a rentier economy, rather than accu-
mulation, where wealth (land resources, forest resources,
human resources and mineral resources) is mobilized for
immediate benefit with no outlook for the future, hence the
difficulties in setting up the mechanisms for sustainable
development17. In such a system, education plays a positi-
ve role in forging a sense of national identity and citizen-
ship, and for the acquisition of the knowledge and skills
required for many jobs. However, in these poor countries,
once the public service intake has reached its limits, educa-
tion expansion then tends to create unemployed intellec-
tuals, and encourages their displacement into the informal
sector of the job market as well as brain drain to the West
(Hugon, 2006).
Not only are education and health critical factors that
account for inequalities between countries, they also
account for disparities among social groups and indivi-
duals. Life expectancy at birth, health and education
levels are very uneven across social groups because of
the highly variable amount of economic, cultural, human
and social capital they possess. Social and family ties
are key factors that explain this unequal access to edu-
cation and healthcare systems. In African countries,
public expenditure and foreign assistance tend to go to
the more privileged groups given: the high inequality
among social groups with respect to education and
access to healthcare services; the nature of health sys-
tems and their financing; and the priority placed on hos-
pitals in big cities and urban educational institutions.
When the fact that part of the State’s fiscal revenues
arises from the export of agricultural products is placed
in the picture, it can be observed that the public health-
care sector and, to a lesser extent, the educational sec-
tor, are instruments of redistribution that disfavor the
poor and benefit the wealthy, and therefore disfavor
rural communities to the benefit of urban groups (World
Bank, 1993; Brunet-Jailly, 2002). Giving populations
widespread access to healthcare and education while
ensuring greater equity and better effectiveness of
these systems thus requires completely reorienting
many basic services.
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17 It can equally be argued that the import of industrial goods and cultural products, particu-
larly books written elsewhere, in exchange for primary products leads to the dispossession of
Sub-Saharan Africa’s cultural consciousness thus hampering its development (Ki-Zerbo,
2003).
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3. Population and Reproductive Health as Catalysts for Sustainable
Development
The strong population growth witnessed after 1950 and the
underdevelopment issue led to many studies and discus-
sions on the relationships between the economy and popu-
lation (cf. Chapter 3). Though very often imbued with ideo-
logical considerations, these have nonetheless contributed
to rethinking population policies (Hodgson, 1983; Rougier,
1999). Many econometric studies show that there is no
concrete statistical relationship between population growth
and economic growth (Kuznets, 1967; Easterlin, 1976;
Blanchet, 1985 and 1991). A recent study by Ndulu (2006)
indicates however that the difference between Africa’s eco-
nomic growth rate and that of other developing countries
between 1960 and 2004 (a per capita income growth rate
1.12% less) is due to demographic factors (a population
growth rate 0.86% higher). However, other factors are also
involved like differences in the rate of school enrollment,
rather unequal income distribution, as well as factors asso-
ciated with institutions and the orientation of economic acti-
vity (with priority placed on obtaining rentier incomes, mar-
ket underregulation, etc.).
In Sub-Saharan Africa, population growth has been a bur-
den on the economy due to the rise in the dependency rate
up to the early 1990s18. This has led to slow growth in per
capita income compared to income per worker. From 1960
to 2000, it is estimated that this led to an annual fall in per
capita income of 0.4% in Sub-Saharan Africa whereas the
other developing regions actually witnessed a fall in their
dependency rate starting from the 1970s. In addition to this
mechanical effect, such high dependency rates tend to
hamper countries efforts to train human capital (Ndulu and
O’Connell, 2006).
Many partial and sector-based summary studies have high-
lighted, on a microeconomic scale, the negative impact of
population growth on economic and social development in
a number of areas (United Nations, 1993; Cassen, 1994).
The negative effects mainly concern child and household
well-being, health status, training of human capital, employ-
ment and the creation of economic opportunities for women
and youths. Even though these effects are minor and their
long-term impact is difficult to ascertain, they did provide
new legitimacy for policy intervention in the domain of popu-
lation in the early 1990s.
This new microeconomic approach to population problems
takes into consideration the relationships between gender,
health and individuals’ reproductive rights. The 1994
International Conference on Population and Development
(ICPD) Consensus of Cairo was based on this approach.
The new consensus in the study of population programs is
grounded: on allowing individuals to readily access the
means that will permit them to manage their sexuality and
fertility, and on empowering women in all areas (Rougier,
1999). The recognition by political and health authorities of
the direct relationships between population and human
development issues is reflected in the form of two different
approaches. The first is quantitative and is based on a sta-
bilization of the world’s population. The second, which is
qualitative, sees promoting access to healthcare services
and education, as prerequisites for slowing down birth rates
and improving reproductive and family health. The neomal-
thusian paradigm, on which population policies had pre-
viously been grounded, has been replaced by the principle
3.1 Demo-economic Relationships and Population Policies
18 The dependency rate expresses the relation between the number of persons not working
and the number of persons working.
stating that “every person has a right to life, liberty and
security of person”. But, though the English Bill of Rights of
1689 presented these fundamental rights as universal, they
did not apply to women. For women to have free choice
over their procreation, it has been necessary to strengthen
their negotiating power, individually and collectively, and to
implement specific policies (United Nations, 1994).
Thus, there is a relationship between population, economic
growth, and development. But the effects of this relation-
ship are not short term, and the relationship between popu-
lation and sustainable development, acknowledged by the
Cairo Consensus, is not direct and univocal. This is rather
a multivariable relationship, and it very much depends on
the capacity (which varies) of societies and social actors to
control the various transformations they go through. Thus,
the relationships that are highlighted should be considered
with caution in this respect, and depending on the case, a
weakness could very well be either an obstacle or an asset.
“Malthusian” situations are found in the Highlands of
Madagascar, the Comoros Islands, coastal regions sur-
rounding Lake Chad, Burundi, Rwanda and in areas threa-
tened by drought. In these areas, population pressure
creates enormous tensions generating a negative impact.
However, positive adjustment to population pressures
observed in the Bamiléké and Kenyan Highlands point
rather to “Boserupian” situations of creative pressure asso-
ciated with high density.
In this work, we attempt to shed light on the complex natu-
re of the relationship between population and the economy
in various societies. We will highlight some virtuous cycles
in Sub-Saharan Africa that should be galvanized and
encouraged. A case in point is when increase in school
enrollment improves the level of education of women and
their participation in economic life leading in the long-term
to a drop in child mortality and a fall in fertility, which in turn
leads to greater investment in human capital. We will also
highlight many vicious cycles that must be circumvented
and avoided. Clearly, the worst case scenario is where civil
conflicts lead to the disorganization of social systems and
production facilities, increasing monetary poverty and a
deterioration of living conditions which then leads to a rise
in mortality, puts the country in a state of serious social
instability and finally brings about the disintegration of all its
institutions. Highlighting the various cycles, whether positi-
ve or negative, virtuous or vicious, mainly goes to show that
we are dealing with a comprehensive system and it is
important to better understand these dynamics through a
multidisciplinary and systemic approach to the relational
patterns at work. As a collorary, political action should take
into consideration the effects and counter-effects of secto-
ral policies by integrating them into more comprehensive
approaches.
The recent history of Sub-Saharan Africa shows that the
region has not been able to take advantage of the first
stages of its population growth to launch a veritable econo-
mic take-off. Population growth in many countries of the
region is currently too fast considering the capacities of
their production system. In fact, these countries are not
capable of providing sufficient resources for educating and
training their human resources in order to instigate a veri-
table social and economic development process. Hence,
questions about which development and population policies
to implement are of utmost importance today.
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3.2 The Context of Population Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Cairo Action Program
and the Millenium Development Goals
While the principles of the Action Program elaborated
during the Cairo Conference in 1994 on “sexual and repro-
ductive health for all” were accepted by the majority of
African countries, in many of them the verbal commitments
have not translated into concrete action. Ten years later,
inspite of the progress made (unequal between countries),
many African populations still do not have access to contra-
ceptives and other reproductive healthcare services nor do
they have any real reproductive rights (Gautier, 2006).
Doubts remain about future progress on the issue since
Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), formulated in 2000,
are now the new development and development assistance
paradigm and override the previously adopted programs
formulated during the Cairo Conference and the Beijing
Conference (1994) on women’s rights.
In the domain of population, 3 out of the 8 Millenium
Development Goals explicitly refer to improving healthcare:
goals 4 and 5 on the reduction of infant mortality and impro-
vement of maternal health, and goal 6 on the fight against
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other diseases. If we add to this
goals 1, 2 and 3 - reduce extreme poverty and hunger,
ensure primary education for all, and promote equality and
autonomy for women, respectively - and goal 7 on ensuring
a sustainable environment, we do have a comprehensive
set of measures for significantly improving the living condi-
tions of African populations19. However, this is limited by the
usual orientations of international institutions based on
already recognized definitions which focus on poverty itself
and on its consequences rather than on the processes that
actually cause poverty (Vimard, 2002)20.
While the substance and the highly quantitative approach of
these 8 MDGs, which are sub-divided into 8 targets and 48
indicators21, may be questioned, this is however a first step
in the path towards ensuring economic and social rights for
all human beings and implementing a global policy of world-
wide redistribution as defined in Goal 8 (“develop a global
partnership for development”). Reducing poverty can no
longer only be done by redistribution at the national level,
as has been the case with past policies, but now requires
redistribution at the world level. In effect, the overall aim of
the MDGs is to provide long-term assistance to social public
services at emerging international standards level thereby
helping to reach minimum standards of living, regardless of
each country’s actual capacity to reach them on its own.
However, the need for a world redistribution effort, which
sounds much more like the social policies of a Provident
State, is marred with a number of risks: virtual tutellage of
public policies in the countries of the South, the manage-
ment of the South’s public services by the countries of the
North, etc. (Severino and Charnoz, 2005). Such a global
redistribution effort will also require a considerable increase
in public assistance for development, which is far from
being a given, seven years after the Millenium
Development Goals were adopted by the international com-
munity. This is rather unsurprising given that the MDGs
were adopted as a catalogue of goals to be reached, but
which laid out no concrete strategy or measures for achie-
ving them.
In this area, we have reason to examine a contradiction
with reference to the poorest countries, particularly those in
Sub-Saharan Africa, as was done by Guengant and
Rafalimanana (2005). Millenium Development Goals do not
explicitly tackle the issue of family planning thereby making
it difficult to reach many of the goals (those related to edu-
cation, to the capacities and rights of women, and to mater-
nal and child mortality) given the high population growth
and the high number of unwanted pregnancies here. Is it
possible to achieve or even come close to achieving the
MDGs in Sub-Saharan Africa without devoting a significant
part of the Cairo Action Program to controlling procreation
and reducing fertility? How can the Cairo Action Program be
implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa when the larger part of
development assistance resources is directed to achieving
MDGs?
This is a real contradiction that needs to be dealt with as the
majority of governments are not able to carry out sound
population policies due to a lack of means. In fact, interna-
tional support for implementing these policies is weak, and
has been falling since 1995. The UNFPA estimates that in
2005 international assistance for family planning initiatives
represented only 3% of the financing provided for popula-
tion programs versus 73% for the fight against HIV/AIDS
(UNFPA, 2005).
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19 Fertility and international migration issues were not included in the MDGs as no consensus
was found by the members of the international community on these issues.
20 The 2006 World Bank report on the theme “Equity and Development” reaffirms this policy
orientation (World Bank, 2005), as broadening development goals well beyond poverty reduc-
tion goes against the traditional policies it recommends (Cling et al., 2005).
21 See: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals.
The complex interdependence between education, health,
sustainable development and population, as we have seen
above, points to the more fundamental problem of poverty.
Access to education, healthcare and fertility control must be
full-blown goals in, and of themselves in order to bolster
individual capacities and rights. It is, however, important to
take into consideration the relationships between these
variables since focusing only on one catalyst area produces
limited results, if any. The timeframe of each of the planned
actions should equally be considered. This implies that
development programs in Sub-Saharan Africa must move
from a sectoral approach to a systemic approach, and that
short cycles of political decision must be reconciled with
long-term strategy.
In this work, we identify five priority action areas that are
presented in random order. While it is important to act on
many catalyst areas simultaneously to prop up virtuous
cycles or strengthen those already started in some coun-
tries, it is also important not to give precedence to any one
of these priority areas even though some actions may seem
more pertinent in some national contexts than others.
i. Developing education is one of the priority areas, as it
encourages long-term growth that is likely to substantially
improve living conditions. Education is a key factor in hel-
ping individuals fulfil their potential and gain access to free-
dom of choice in various aspects of life: it enables indivi-
duals to obtain more favorable job opportunities; encou-
rages equality between men and women as well as
women’s autonomy; enables the individual to fight against
poverty; and enables a sustainable management of envi-
ronmental resources. From the demographic standpoint,
education plays a key role in lowering mortality and fertility,
and also in improving health status, particularly mother and
child health. More specifically, the increase in educational
opportunities for women is critical as it encourages their
participation in modern salaried jobs, a key factor for falling
fertility worldwide since the 1960s (Caldwell, 2004), and is
also one of the significant factors for falling fertility in Sub-
Saharan Africa. It should be noted, however, that universal
primary enrolment and greater access to secondary educa-
tion is unattainable in the short term for the majority of Sub-
Sahara African countries. Efforts in education must be
directed towards increasing enrolment numbers as well as
improving the quality and content of teaching. Such efforts
must certainly be sustained in the long-term. For many
countries, attaining a level where the majority of women of
procreation age and more than half of the workforce have a
secondary level of education will require sustained efforts
for at least thirty years.
ii. The fight against child mortality must also be a major
operational priority area. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 1 out of
every 6 children (17%) dies before reaching the age of five.
Given the present state of modern medicine, many of these
deaths could be avoided (WHO, 2005). This high child mor-
tality reveals the extent of underdevelopment and is a
contributing factor to the poverty trap inasmuch as it is a
major reason for the high fertility. Improving living standards
(better nutrition and housing) will contribute to a better
mother and child health status. Progress in educating
mothers and fathers should lead to improvement in morbi-
dity statuses. Besides an overalll reduction in human pover-
ty, there is also the need to improve healthcare programs.
Four major intervention areas, which also concern children,
should be foreseen: the fights against malaria, against
infectious diseases, against diarrheal diseases and against
AIDS. The fight against malaria (prevention and treatment)
is essential as malaria is the cause of death of one million
children in Sub-Saharan Africa each year22. Improving
immunization and treatment programs for diarrheal
diseases must equally be a healthcare policy priority as
25% of Africa’s children do not receive any vaccine or treat-
ment for diarrheal diseases (UNICEF, 2005b: 22).
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3.3 What should be done? Priority Catalyst Areas for Galvanizing Virtuous Cycles
22 Here is what Jeffrey Sachs, the special advisor of the UN Secretary General on the
Millenium Development Goals, had to say in this respect in an interview published in the Le
Monde newspaper on January, 18, 2005: “[Malaria] is a disease that can be prevented in a
majority of cases and can be treated in all cases. We know how to go about reducing the num-
ber of deaths and patients in a very short period. There is need for adequate medicines and
mosquito nets. I find unpardonable that African children go to bed without the protection of a
mosquito net which only costs $5. A mosquito net lasts for 5 years giving a yearly cost of $1
per inhabitant of rich countries”. Such an anti-malarial plan will only cost about 2 to 3 billion
US dollars per year.
Preventing children from contracting HIV/AIDS, which
mainly occurs via mother-to-child transmission, (during pre-
gnancy or through breast feeding), is equally important
given the direct and indirect effects of this disease. In effect,
the number of children 0-14 years old living with HIV/AIDS
in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2005 is estimated at 2 million while
the number of AIDS orphans is estimated at 12 million
(ONUSIDA, 2006). In some countries, AIDS is a key factor
in rising child mortality, which not only touches AIDS stric-
ken children but also AIDS orphans whose parents died
from AIDS causing disintegration of family units. In the fight
against AIDS, just like in the fights against malaria, infec-
tious diseases and diarrheal diseases, positive results can
be obtained in a very short timeframe, so long as the pro-
grams implemented (horizontal or vertical, public or private)
are well organized and have sufficient resources. It is
equally important to develop programs for treating infected
children, which are proven to be effective (Elenga et al.,
2006).
iii. Access to healthcare is also a high priority area. Health
is an integral part of development, and deprivation of heal-
th is an aspect of underdevelopment. Lacking access to
health information, healthcare services and medical treat-
ment is an element of poverty for the individual. On the
country level, lacking adequate healthcare facilities is an
element of underdevelopment. As pointed out by Sen, it is
equally important to interpret the connections between, on
the one hand, health status and the development of the
healthcare sector, and on the other hand, the individual’s
quality of life as a galvanizing agent in the economy, as well
as an agent of social and policy change. The issue of heal-
thcare systems’ effectiveness should be placed at the cen-
ter of development policies (Mach, 2004). It is more of a
question of promoting healthcare services (and reproducti-
ve health services, see below) accessible to everyone, par-
ticularly the most destitute (FNUAP, 2004). In Sub-Saharan
Africa, there are highly unequal levels of access. Hence,
these policies must include an element of equity necessary
for long-term growth and development and ensure access
to healthcare services for everyone23.
Faced with this equity requirement, the strategic issue that
then comes up is that of financing. While the resources allo-
cated to the healthcare sector increased in the region’s
richer countries, in the poorer countries, these have stagna-
ted and even fallen in some cases. In addition to this
inequality between countries, there are inequalities bet-
ween families as the majority of African States have given
up on the idea of free healthcare for all due to budget
constraints. As a result, since the Bamako Initiative in the
mid 1980s, States have now resorted to paid medical servi-
ce to cover costs, which is a major drawback for poorer
families24. Hence, more often than not, they are forced to
make medically unfounded choices regarding whether or
not to seek the healthcare or medicines prescribed to them,
and between modern or traditional medicine. It is important
to come up with mechanisms to finance access to healthca-
re services (user contributions, social security, mutual insu-
rance company, grants, etc.) that are adjusted to patients’
different economic status and level of income as well as to
the nature of the healthcare services provided (Audibert et
al., 2003). As is the case of the fight against child mortality,
it is also possible to quickly improve populations’ health sta-
tus by making minimal improvements in primary healthcare
service, which would increase life expectancy at birth (par-
ticularly in countries where it is below 50 years). But this
requires: adequate healthcare coverage over the entire
national territory; good complementarity between the
various levels of healthcare services (primary health cen-
ters, intermediate facilities and national reference hospi-
tals); competent, motivated and uncorrupt personnel; and in
short, a satisfactory operation of the public healthcare sys-
tem. This is far from being the case in many countries. In
fact, recent anthropological studies in a number of West
African countries have pointed out that most public health-
care systems are in very sad states (Jaffré and Olivier de
Sardan, 2003)
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23 The idea of equity has been identified as one of the factors likely to speed up the demogra-
phic transition (Repetto, 1978).
24 It is estimated that 40% of the total expenditure on the healthcare sector in Africa comes
from individuals while state expenditure only accounts for about 37%. The greater portion of
donor financing is earmarked for the budgets for equipment and facilities development rather
than to assist in the financing of current operating expenditure like salaries, medicines and
maintenance (World Bank, 1997).
iv. Access for all to reproductive health services is ano-
ther priority area that is most often ignored given the critical
nature of other problems faced by healthcare services in
general. There are many difficulties in trying to provide
access to reproductive health services for all. The first diffi-
culty is linked to the very broad definition established during
the Cairo Conference, which extends to maternal and child
health, family planning, sexually transmitted diseases,
seropositivity and AIDS, sterility, post-abortion healthcare,
genital cancers, conjugal violence, fertility and sexual
rights. Inspite of the importance of all these elements, it is
most often impossible to come up with the means required
to address all of them satisfactorily, hence the need to make
choices. The second difficulty has to do with the recommen-
dation to integrate reproductive health services into the
public healthcare system for the sake of coherence and
economics of scale. In fact, many less developed countries
acknowledge that they are unprepared for this integration
due to institutional and operational bureaucratic bottle-
necks. Hence the need for vertical programs to deal with
certain problems like: the fight against AIDS, the fight
against malaria, immunization against some diseases, etc.
In fact, the recommended overall approach to reproductive
health tends to make family planning a matter of seconda-
ry importance. However, the 1994 Cairo declaration is most
welcome in this respect: “All countries must take measures
to meet up as soon as possible with the needs of their
population in the area of family planning and, by 2015
should strive by all means to make available a complete
range of reliable family planning methods and associated
reproductive health services, which are not contrary to law,
for every person.” This commitment has gone unheeded
inspite of the many unmet needs in the area of family plan-
ning in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a basic deprivation of
human rights for an individual to lack the means to safely
control his/her procreation.
While it is important to focus on providing information,
access to family planning services and its follow-up, for
many countries, however, meeting the population’s needs
in this area remains a distant goal. In effect, the figures on
the contraceptive prevalence rate at the beginning of the
2000s range from 10 to 40% in the majority of Sub-Sahara
African countries. Assuming that the contraceptive preva-
lence rate is increased by one percentage point yearly, it
will take between 30 to 60 years to arrive at a prevalence
rate of 70%, which fulfills requirements; and between 15 to
30 years if the goal is to increase the contraceptive preva-
lence rate by two points each year, something that very few
countries in the world have actually managed to achieve
(Guengant and Rafalimanana, 2005). Thus, it will take time
for population growth to slow down and this will only be
achieved through fertility control and a continuous rise in
the use of contraceptives. It is critical to turn to the commit-
ments undertaken during the Cairo Conference of 1994
given that most of the Millenium Development Goals (parti-
cularly those concerning education, equality between men
and women and women’s autonomy, reduction of maternal
and infant mortality) are hindered in most Sub-Sahara
African countries by high population growth, at-risk pre-
gnancy (numerous, poorly spaced, early and late) and
unwanted pregnancies.
v. Improving young generations’ access to reproducti-
ve health should be a specific area within the framework of
a policy that goes well beyond the mere provision of heal-
thcare services. The behavior of young generations in
upcoming years will be decisive in shaping this region’s
population dynamics. These youths start their sexual and
reproductive lives in an environment of social and economic
precariousness associated with rising educational costs
and the underemployment of those breaking into the job
market, as well as in an environment rendered vulnerable
healthwise with the spread of HIV/AIDS (cf. Chapter 6).
Today, we are faced with a changing social context in terms
of sexuality and procreation with the relaxation of behavior
controls previously enforced by family institutions on the
basis of tradition. Moreover, new actors have emerged
(schools, the media, NGOs, and peers) that are dictating
new behavioural models, especially among adolescents
and youths. These trends have led to a decline in traditio-
nal behavior among youths leading to a rise in the age of
first marriage. This, together with the relaxation of family
control, has contributed to the rise of premarital sexuality
and risk behavior leading to the rise of STDs as well as pre-
marital fertility and abortion. In effect, unmarried youths
have difficulties getting access to reproductive health ser-
vices. This explains their low level of contraceptive use,
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especially of modern methods25, and their frequent recour-
se to voluntary pregnancy interruption – associated with
high morbidity and mortality given the non-medical contexts
of the procedures. To bring this precarious succession of
events to an end, it is necessary to develop sexual and
reproductive health programs that target youth and enable
them to easily get access to reproductive health services
even if they are not married. If these actions are well orga-
nized and effectively carried out, this should generate rela-
tively quick results, particularly in preventing early pregnan-
cies and risk behavior.
All the priority actions briefly presented here should galva-
nize new positive dynamics by bringing together virtuous
cycles combining progress in education, improvement of
health status and fertility control, reduction of mortality and
fertility, progress in inserting youth into the job market,
increase in the productivity of economic agents, etc. Apart
from the priorities pointed out here, we can also cite actions
that are not dealt with in this work but which are just as
necessary for the success of the virtuous cycles referred to
above. These include: the fight against corruption (very
detrimental to equal-opportunity healthcare systems, cf.
Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan, 2003), better state control
over its territory, the end of civil conflicts, the return of refu-
gees to their country...
3. Population and Reproductive Health as Catalysts for Sustainable Development
© AFD Working Paper N°62 • Africa and its Demographic Challenges: an Uncertain Future
25
25 While use of condoms has recently been on the rise with promotion campaigns carried out
during HIV/AIDS prevention programs, its usage is more often than not incorrect or it tends to
be used irregularly.
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4. Research Priorities for Improving Knowledge
Despite recent progress in terms of survey data, particularly
with the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program,
basic demographic and economic data remain insufficient and
virtually non-existent for countries affected by civil wars
(Angola, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Somalia, etc.). Even when such data is available, it is hardly
useful for an indepth analysis of the relationship between
population changes and economic changes. The same goes
for social and health statistics, which are often scant and of litt-
le use. Moreover, getting information from primary sources
such as population surveys is often difficult, if not altogether
impossible. These gaps in the data are drawbacks to resear-
ch. There is therefore a need to tackle these difficulties to bet-
ter understand the various interrelations at work and their
dynamics over time, which is useful in elaborating policy.
Deficiencies of available analyses, highlighted in this com-
posite book, and operational priorities that we have identi-
fied above, point to some of the priority areas for research
in the upcoming years.
i. Understanding demo-economic relationships and the
impact of poverty. Research analyzing the population-deve-
lopment relationships is greatly hindered, especially in Africa,
by a lack of data relating demography and economy. The reci-
procal effects between population growth (high or slowing
down) and economic growth remain a gray area. Population
dynamics and population policies are often overlooked in eco-
nomic studies. And even when they are mentioned, it is usual-
ly done in passing or marginally. Inversely, population studies
tend to ignore economic dynamics and only consider a few
individual variables (economic activity, activity status, material
living conditions, etc.). Given these shortcomings, research
needs to give more importance to demo-economic relation-
ships: the effect of poverty on demographic behaviors, the
relationship between population structures and economic
dynamics, among others. The relationship between poverty
and reproductive behavior, which is a focal point of this work,
is one particularly notable gray area in the research. Toomany
studies are limited to the differential study of fertility relative to
standards of living. Even though this descriptive approach is
useful, it is however insufficient and should rather extend to all
intermediary variables, and particularly behavior of fertility
control, which vary in relation to level of poverty. The interac-
tion between poverty and mortality, especially adult mortality,
is another gray area which is poorly documented. Poverty
engenders malnourishment and a short-term subsistence
logic, usually unconducive to a good health status. Inversely,
disease and mortality are factors that lead to poverty and vul-
nerability: fall in work productivity and less involvement in
schooling, family instability, less social mobility, etc.
Demographers must broaden the scope of their data to inclu-
de all these areas (for instance, by organizing surveys on
living conditions and budget-consumption) and better integra-
te demographic and economic data into their analyses.
ii. Understanding the decisive factors behind current
population changes. In demography, the factors determi-
ning trend reversal or stabilization, which have been major
phenomena in the recent history of Sub-Saharan Africa, are
poorly understood. These trend reversals and interruptions
to the progress of demographic transition must be studied
in depth and monitored in order to better assess the true
nature of these phenomena, whether incidental or structu-
ral. In particular, there is a need to better understand rising
mortality, and consequently the associated question of
decline in health status, fertility stabilization and low use of
contraceptives. A multidisciplinary approach integrating
demographic, economic and sociological analyses is nee-
ded here given the diverse nature of the factors involved.
Such research could focus on the impact of crises and
poverty, on the consequences of AIDS and emergent and
resurgent diseases, on the effects of the financial policy
reorientation of health programs (reorientation of financing
from family planning to the fight against AIDS, in particular)
and on the repercussions of civil crises and conflicts that
have torn apart many countries on the continent.
iii. Interpreting the low progress in contraceptive use.
The failed demographic transition, essentially marked by
high mortality rates and low progress in contraceptive use,
merits special attention. Concerning low progress in contra-
ceptive use, especially in Francophone African countries, a
number of issues need to be looked at in depth: firstly, the
underlying reason why desired fertility is so high to better
account for the persistently high fertility and low contracep-
tive use in various populations; secondly, the causes of the
low supply and the poor quality of contraceptive services
provided to populations; thirdly, the reasons why many
people prefer other contraceptive practices to modern
methods. In this last respect, there is a need to take a look
at African populations’ adoption of relatively new and atypi-
cal ways of controlling fertility (when compared to the
modes of fertility control in more classical transitions) with
increasing diversity in behavior of fertility control.
iv. Analyzing the factors of high mortality. Persistant
high mortality, decline in health status, and high social and
geographical inequalities all point to the need for studies on
mortality. Despite recent improvements in data collection
via demographic and health surveys, demographic studies
on mortality have been inadequate since the 1980s. It is
important to emphasize a number of gray areas in particu-
lar. First of all, more emphasis should be placed on adult
mortality. This is a poorly understood area although it could
well be a relatively significant part of total mortality, consi-
dering the fall in child mortality. In fact, the former has been
on the rise in some countries for reasons not always attri-
butable to AIDS. It is also important to carry out studies on
the causes of mortality in order to make up for fragmentary
knowledge, and for better orientating health and medical
research programs. AIDS associated mortality should also
be an important area of research as its impact and trends
are not fully understood. In fact, AIDS is one of the most
significant contemporary factors in the domains of popula-
tion and health. It is now the main cause of adult mortality
in some Sub-Saharan Africa countries, and has completely
altered the area’s cause-of-death ratios. AIDS, and fear of
AIDS, have also brought about a change in the biology and
behaviour of human reproduction in ways that are poorly
understood. In upcoming years, the trends of the pandemic
will have a critical bearing on the trends of life expectancy
and population structures. Explanatory studies on mortality
are still in their infancy. A critical theoretical framework is
needed to delineate the mechanisms of precariousness
and to explain its effects on human health. Finally, more
studies should be directed towards the unequal exposure to
risk factors, the unequal access to healthcare systems as
well as the differences within the systems.
v. Improving knowledge on the effectiveness of some
operational catalyst areas. Analyses of the complex rela-
tionship between education, health and population should
focus on research areas that will lead to better grasping the
processes by which progress made in education and heal-
th are important catalysts of demographic transition. To start
with, institutional environments have to be taken into consi-
deration. It is in this context where great poverty arises that
the situation of weak and fragile states should be examined.
It will be useful to determine with the specificities of the rela-
tionship between population, health and education
variables in the contexts of weak institutions and authori-
ties, where conflicts and insecurity are recurrent, and where
little data and few analyses are available. It is important to
identify the thresholds that define poverty traps and those
that bring together different complementary catalyst areas
into play. With its increasing presence in many countries,
the role of religion, especially evangelical churches and
Islam, in demographic behaviours should also be conside-
red. Finally, it is necessary to develop practical research to
better understand the actual impacts of the various health
and educational programs. The following areas should be
given particular attention: health programs aimed at redu-
cing inequalities in morbidity and mortality; family planning
programs; the respective impacts of integrated programs
and vertical programs; and finally, the results of programs
aimed at reducing differences in the school enrolment of
boys and girls.
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5. Conclusion
In 2004, a group of experts was assembled by the US
National Intelligence Council to carry out a prospective
assessment of the future of Sub-Saharan Africa for the
2020-2030 horizon. They did not find it worthwhile to exa-
mine the demographic phenomena of the region, which
they deemed too unpredictable (NIC, 2004), as if the eco-
nomic and political domains were devoid of similar contin-
gencies and uncertainties! We, on the contrary, believe that
it is crucial to integrate population issues into scientific thin-
king and political action.
Sub-Saharan Africa is ridden with poverty and inequality with
44% of its population living in a state of extreme poverty.
What applies in the domain of economics and the environ-
ment (with respect to employment, and access to natural
resources, means of production, technology and knowledge)
also applies to the domain of population. There are very few
means available to Africans for controlling fertility and fighting
against diseases (more rampant and deadly here than anyw-
here else in the the world), and the few means that exist tend
to be unequally distributed among the countries and various
social categories. Life expectancy in the region has dropped
to 49 years from 50 years in the 1980s. Nearly 1 out of every
10 children dies before the age of 1, while 1 child out of every
6 children dies before the age of 5. The maternal mortality
rate of 870 per 100,000 live births is by far the highest in the
world. These are but a few of the indicators highlighted in this
work that attest to the critical nature of the situation in the
region, with some countries in better situations while the
conditions in others are much more dramatic.
In this summary, the major factors in the relationship bet-
ween education, health, reproductive health, population
and development are delineated. Some operational priority
areas are suggested in the domain of population, and prio-
rity areas of research needed for better guiding policy
action are highlighted. To conclude, we underline below the
major characteristics of Sub-Sahara Africa’s demo-econo-
mic trend to better understand the political stakes:
 late entry into the demographic transition movement
(slow fall in mortality or rising mortality; high fertility with
uneven downward trends) compared to other develo-
ping regions;
 low economic and social development based on a ren-
tier economy dominated by a low value-added primary
production sector (agriculture, coastal fishing, forest
exploitation, and mining) usually associated with wides-
pread monetary poverty, often extreme, and very poor
living conditions;
 diversification of demographic regimes, and political
and economic systems. Depending on the country
concerned and period, population growth is more or
less high, the political regime is more or less democra-
tic and the economy is more or less strong. South of the
Sahara, there is not one Africa but rather several
“Africas” given the diversity of countries, which differ
from one another within the same sub-regions and are
less homogenous than could be imagined despite the
presence of the neighborhood effect;
 increase in social and spatial inequalities within the
same country with respect to population (nuptiality, fer-
tility, mortality) and economy (access to education,
employment, area of residence, etc.). These inequali-
ties explain the marked economic differences and social
stratification between the educated and illiterate, and
between urban and rural inhabitants;
 dramatic reversal of some progress made with res-
pect to mortality and adult or infanto-juvenile health
status due to AIDS, conflicts and poverty. Southern
Africa, which was once the most developed region in
every respect as well as the most advanced in its
demographic transition, now has the lowest life
expectancy at birth due to the impacts of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic on the region. This reversal also
applies to the economy, especially with respect to the
unpredictable nature of international prices of primary
products, oil, and cash crops, as well as political insta-
bility and economic disorganization. Zimbabwe is in
many respects an extreme case of reversal and decli-
ne in both areas. Formerly a leader in progress in
healthcare and population growth control, Zimbabwe
is today encumbered by HIV/AIDS and has seen a
dramatic fall in its life expectancy. This country once
had a flourishing export oriented economy and agri-
cultural sector, but is now on the brink of bankruptcy
because of poorly managed agricultural reform. It is
faced with skyrocketing inflation, a breakdown of
public services and massive impoverishment of the
population.
A reversal and decline in these significant areas has
recently been observed in a number of countries. Some
economies have, however, been improving or recovering,
particularly because of the rise in the prices of oil and
mining products. We are also witnessing a noticeable fall
in population growth in some countries and certain popu-
lation categories. This all points to the divergent realities
and the uncertain future of Sub-Saharan Africa. While
there is no reason here for fatalism - significant advances
have been made in the fight against onchocerciasis and
in dramatically reducing the number of cases of dracun-
culosis and leprosy -, all these areas will require impro-
ved and ongoing efforts. This is particularly the case of
immunization policies.
The classic demographic transition model is not unfolding in
Sub-Saharan Africa as it did in other developing regions.
Health status has hardly improved, the level of technology
is low and dependency on working adults is high. Adopting
and implementing policies geared towards the priority
action areas we have suggested: education, the reduction
of mortality, equitable access (including youths) to healthca-
re and reproductive health services, should galvanize pro-
gress and improve living conditions. Actions focusing on
population should be embedded within a larger framework
of development policy without which their impact on the
overall dynamics will be limited. This broad policy orienta-
tion should largely focus on economic growth and, in parti-
cular on: pursuing productivity gains in agriculture, impro-
ving the management of oil and mining revenues, resolving
internal conflicts and conflicts between countries, and
achieving political stability, all goals that hinge upon streng-
thening democratic states and stifling nepotic and sectarian
tendencies.
5. Conclusion
© AFD Working Paper N°62 • Africa and its Demographic Challenges: an Uncertain Future
29
© AFD Working Paper N°62 • Africa and its Demographic Challenges: an Uncertain Future
30
Bibliography
AUDIBERT M., MATHONNAT J. and DE ROODENBEKE É. (2003), “Évolutions et nouvelles orientations pour le financement de la santé
dans les pays en développement à faible revenu”, Cahiers d’études et de recherches francophones/Santé, vol. 13, n° 4, p.
209-14.
BEHRMAN J. (1996), “The Impact of Health and Nutrition on Education”, The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 11, n° 1, p.
23-38.
Blanchet D. (1985), “Croissances économique et démographique dans les pays en développement : indépendance ou inter-
dépendance ?”, Population, vol. 40, n° 1, p. 29-46.
— (1991), Modélisation démo-économique. Conséquences économiques des évolutions démographiques, Paris, INED-PUF.
BONGAARTS J. (2006), “The Causes of Stalling Fertility Transitions”, Studies in Family Planning, vol. 37, n° 1, p. 1-16.
BRUNET-JAILLY J. (2002), “La santé”, in Tapinos G.P., Hugon P. and Vimard P. (dir.), La Côte d’Ivoire à l’aube du XXIe siècle,
Paris, Karthala, coll. “Hommes et Sociétés”, p. 325-367.
CALDWELL J.C. (2004), “Demographic Theory: A Long View”, Population and Development Review, vol. 30, n° 2, p. 297-316.
CASSEN R. (dir.) (1994), Population and Development: Old Debates, New Conclusions, New Brunswick-New Jersey-Oxford,
Transaction Publishers.
CHESNAIS J.-C. (1986), La Transition démographique, Paris, INED-PUF, Cahier n° 113.
CLAPHAM C. (2006), “The Political Economy of African Population Change”, in Demeny P. and McNicoll G. (eds.), The Political
Economy of Global Population Change 1950-2050, Population and Development Review Supplements, p. 96-114.
CLING J.-P., COGNEAU D., LOUP J. et al. (2005), Le Développement, une question de chances ? À propos du Rapport sur le déve-
loppement dans le monde 2006 « Équité et développement », Paris, DIAL, Document de travail n° 15.
COGHLAN B., BRENNAN R.J., NGOY P. et al. (2006), “Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Nationwide Survey”, The
Lancet, vol. 367, n° 9504, p. 44-51.
Cohen B. (1998), “The Emerging Fertility Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa”, World Development, vol. 26, n° 8, p. 1431-1461.
DEMENY P. and MCNICOLL G. (2006), “The Political Demography of the World System, 2000-2050”, in Demeny P. and McNicoll G.
(eds.), The Political Economy of Global Population Change, 1950-2050, Population and Development Review Supplements,
p. 254-287.
EASTERLIN R. (1967), “Effects of Population Growth on the Economic Development of Developing Countries”, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, n° 369, p. 98-108.
ECA (Economic Commission for Africa) (2005), Economic Report on Africa 2005. Meeting the Challenges of Unemployment
and Poverty in Africa, United Nations-EAC, http://www.uneca.org/era2005/
ELENGA N., FASSINOU P., DOSSOU R. et al. (2006), “La tache aveugle de l’infection par le VIH en Afrique : la prise en charge de
l’infection pédiatrique. L’expérience d’un programme pilote, ‘le Programme Enfant Yopougon’“, in Adjamagbo A., Msellati P.
and Vimard P. (dir.), Santé de la reproduction et fécondité dans les pays du Sud. Nouveaux contextes et nouveaux comporte-
ments, Louvain-la- Neuve, Academia-Bruylant, p. 333-360.
FASSASSI R. and VIMARD P. (2002), “Pratique contraceptive et contrôle de la fécondité en Côte d’Ivoire”, in Guillaume A.,
Desgrées du Loû A., Zanou B. et Koffi N. (dir.), Santé de la reproduction en Afrique, Abidjan, ENSEA-FNUAP-IRD, p. 189-213.
FNUAP (2004), L’État de la population mondiale 2004. Le Consensus du Caire, dix ans après : la population, la santé en matiè-
re de reproduction et l’effort mondial pour éliminer la pauvreté, New York.
GAUTIER A. (2006), “L’information sur les méthodes contraceptives dix ans après le programme d’action du Caire”, in Adjamagbo
A., Msellati P. and Vimard P. (dir.), Santé de la reproduction et fécondité dans les pays du Sud. Nouveaux contextes et nou-
veaux comportements, Louvain-la-Neuve, Academia-Bruylant, p. 41-74.
GUILLAUME A. (2000), L’Avortement en Afrique : mode de contrôle des naissances et problème de santé publique, CEPED, coll.
“La chronique du Ceped” n° 37, avril-juin.
— (2003), “Le rôle de l’avortement dans la transition de la fécondité à Abidjan au cours des années 1990”, Population, vol. 58,
n° 6, p. 741-772.
GUENGANT J.-P. and RAFALIMANANA H. (2005), “The Cairo Approach: Making Reproductive Health and Family Planning
Programmes more Acceptable or Embracing too much?”, Communication au XXVe Congrès général de la population de
l’UIESP, Tours, 18 au 23 juillet.
HERBST J. (2000), States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton, Princeton University
Press.
HILL A. (1996), “La mortalité des jeunes enfants : ses tendances”, in Foote K.A., Hill K.H. and Martin L.G. (dir.), Changements
démographiques en Afrique subsaharienne, Paris, INED-PUF, coll. “Travaux et Documents”, Cahier n° 135, p. 155-215.
HODGSON D. (1983), “Demography as a Social Science and Policy Science”, Population and Development Review, vol. 15, n°
1, p. 1-34.
HUGON P. (2006), L’Économie de l’Afrique, Paris, La Découverte, coll. “Repères”.
ILIFFE J. (1995), Africa: The History of a Continent, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
JAFFRÉ Y. and OLIVIER DE SARDAN J.-P. (dir.) (2003), Une médecine inhospitalière, Paris, Karthala, coll. “Hommes et Sociétés”.
KI-ZERBO J. (2003), À quand l’Afrique ?, Entretien avec René Holenstein, La Tour d’Aigues, Éditions de l’Aube.
KUZNETS S. (1967), “Population and Economic Growth”, Proceeding of the American Philosophy Society, vol. 111, n° 3.
MACH A. (2004), “Amartya Sen, développement et santé”, À notre santé, La lettre de l’OMS, OMS,
http://www.who.int/infwha52/to_our_health/developpement_ et_sante.html.
MATHERS C.D. AND LONCAR D. (2006), “Projections of Global Mortality and Burden of Disease from 2002 to 2030”, PLoS Med, vol.
3, n° 11, p. 442.
MESLE F. and VALLIN J. (1997), “La mortalité dans le monde : tendances et perspectives”, in Chasteland J.-C. et Chesnais J.-C.
(dir.), La Population du monde. Enjeux et problèmes, Paris, INED-PUF, p. 461-479.
MOSER K., SHKOLNIKOV V. and LEON D.A. (2005), “World Mortality 1950-2000: Divergence Replaces Convergence from the Late
1980s”, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 83, n° 3, p. 202-209.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (2004), Africa in 2020, National Intelligence Council 2020 Project, Summary of Discussion by
Select Panel of US Experts, Discussion paper, January 9.
— (2005), Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa’s Future, Conference summary, mars, http://www.dni.gov/nic/confreports_africa_futu-
re.html.
NATIONS UNIES (1994), Rapport de la Conférence internationale sur la population et le développement, Le Caire 5-13 sep-
tembre, New
York, Nations unies.
— (2003), World Population Prospects. The 2002 Revision, New York, UNITED NATIONS.
NDULU B.J. (2006), “Ramping up African Growth: Lessons from Five Decades of Growth Experience”, Economic Affairs, vol. 26,
n° 4, p. 5-11.
NDULU B.J. and O’CONNELL S. (2006), Policy Plus: African Economic Growth 1960-2000, AERC Mini-Plenary Session on the
Growth Project (may 2005, revised July 2006).
OMS (Organisation mondiale de la santé) (2005), Rapport sur la santé 2005-Donnons sa chance à chaque mère et à chaque
Bibliography
© AFD Working Paper N°62 • Africa and its Demographic Challenges: an Uncertain Future
31
enfant, Genève, OMS.
ONUSIDA (2006), Rapport sur l’épidémie mondiale de sida 2006. Édition spéciale 10e anniversaire de l’ONUSIDA, Genève,
ONUSIDA. http://www.unaids.org/en/HIV_data/2006GlobalReport/2006- GR_fr.asp.
REPETTO R. (1978), “The Interaction of Fertility in the Size Distribution of Income”, The Journal of Development Studies, vol. 14,
p. 22-39.
ROSS J. and STOVER J. (2001), “The Family Planning Program Effort Index: 1999 Cycle”, International Family Planning
Perspectives, vol. 27, n° 3, September, p. 119-129.
ROUGIER E. (1999), Les Conséquences économiques de la croissancedémographique : 35 ans de débat entre orthodoxie et
relativisme, Bordeaux, Centre d’économie du développement, Document de travail n° 33.
RUTSTEIN S.O. and JOHNSON K. (2004), The DHS Wealth Index, Calverton, Maryland, ORC Macro, DHS Comparative Reports n° 6.
SCHOUMAKER B. (2004), “Pauvreté et fécondité en Afrique subsaharienne : perspectives théoriques et analyses empiriques”,
African Population Studies, Supplement A to vol. 19, p. 13-45.
SEN A. (1999), Un nouveau modèle économique. Développement, justice et liberté, Paris, Odile Jacob.
SEVERINO J.-M. and CHARNOZ O. (2005), “Les ‘mutations impromptues’. État des lieux de l’aide publique au développement”,
Afrique contemporaine, n° 213, p. 13-131.
TABUTIN D. (1997), “Les transitions démographiques en Afrique subsaharienne. Spécificité, changements... et incertitudes”, in
UIESP (dir.), Actes du Congrès international de la population, Beijing, vol. 1, p. 219-246.
TABUTIN D. and SCHOUMAKER B. (2001), “Une analyse régionale des transitions de fécondité en Afrique subsaharienne”,
Communication au XXIVe Congrès général de la population, Salvador-Brazil août 2001, UIESP.
— (2004), “La démographie de l’Afrique au sud du Sahara des années 1950 aux années 2000”, Population, vol. 59, n° 3-4, p.
521-622.
TIMÆUS I. (1996), “La mortalité adulte”, in Foote K.A., Hill K.H. et Martin L.G. (dir.), Changements démographiques en Afrique
subsaharienne, Paris, INED-PUF, coll. “Travaux et Documents”, Cahier n° 135, p. 217-254.
UNFPA (2005), Financing the ICPD Programme of Action: Data for 2003, Estimate for 2004/05,
http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib_pub_file/527_filename_ financing_icpd_programme.pdf.
UNICEF (2005a), Indicateurs du Millénaire : mortalité des enfants de moins de 5 ans pour 1 000 naissances vivantes (estima-
tions de l’UNICEF), mis à jour le 24 février 2005.
— (2005b), La Situation des enfants dans le monde 2006. Exclus et invisibles, New York, Unicef.
UNITED NATIONS (1993), Population Growth and Economic Development, Report of the Consultative Meeting of Economists
convened by the United Nations Population Fund, 28-29 September 1992, New York, UNFPA.
— (2005), World Population Prospects. The 2004 Revision, New York, United Nations.
— (2006a), Millenium Development Goals Report 2006, New York, United Nations.
— (2006b), World Mortality Report 2005, New York, Population Division of United Nations, ST/ESA/SR/A/252. SYNTHÈSE
365
— (2007a), World Population Prospects. The 2006 Revision, Population Database, United Nations, Population Division,
http://esa.un.org/unpp/.
— (2007b), World Population Prospects. The 2006 Revision. Highlights, New York, United Nations, Population Division.
UNPD (2006), Human Development Report 2006. Beyond scarcity:Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis, NewYork.
VIMARD P. (2002), “Pauvretés, crises et population”, in Charbit Y. (dir.), Population et développement, Paris, La Documentation
française, coll. des “Notes et études documentaires”, p. 43-73.
VIMARD P. and FASSASSI R. (2005), L’Évolution de la contraception en Afrique, Communication à la Conférence virtuelle du
GRIPPS “La régulation de la fécondité en Afrique : transformations et différenciations au tournant du XXIe siècle”, 12 au 15
octobre.
VIMARD P., FASSASSI R. and TALNAN E. (2007), “Le début de la transition de la fécondité en Afrique subsaharienne”, in Adjamagbo A.,
Bibliography
© AFD Working Paper N°62 • Africa and its Demographic Challenges: an Uncertain Future
32
Msellati P. and Vimard P. (dir.), Santé de la reproduction et fécondité dans les pays du Sud. Nouveaux contextes et nouveaux
comportements, Louvain-la-Neuve, Academia-Bruylant, p. 173-214.
WORLD BANK (2006), Africa Development Indicators 2006, Washington D.C., Oxford University Press.
WORLD BANK (1993), World Development Report 1993. Investing in Health, Washington.
— (1997), “Cost Sharing: Towards Sustainable Health Care in Sub-Saharan Africa “, Findings. Africa Region, n° 63, mai.
— (2005), World Development Report 2006. Equity and Development, New York, Oxford University Press.
Bibliography
© AFD Working Paper N°62 • Africa and its Demographic Challenges: an Uncertain Future
33
© AFD Working Paper N°62 • Africa and its Demographic Challenges: an Uncertain Future
34
Appendix 1
Table 1: Economic Growth and Population Growth by Sub-Sahara African Country
Level of Population Growth: Level of Economic Growth:
average annual population Average annual growth rate of GNP, 1996-2005 (%)
growth rate,2000-2005 Very Low or Declining Low Growth Sustained Growth Oil Exports Led Growth
Growth(-2.4 to 2.8%) (3.1 to 4.0%) (4.5 to 8.4%) (1.7 to 20.9%)
Érithrea (2.2; 4.3) Uganda (6.1; 3.4)
Sierra Leone (1.1; 4.1) Benin (4.8; 3.2) Chad (7.8; 3.4)
3% and above Burundi (1.2; 3.0) Niger (3.5; 3.4) Burkina Faso (4.6; 3.2) Congo (3.5; 3.0)
Guinea-Bissau (0.6; 3.0)) Mali (5.7; 3.0)
Mauritania (4.9; 3.0)
Gambia (4.5; 2.8)
Madagascar (3.3; 2.8) Éthiopia (5.5; 2.4)
Togo (3.3; 2.7) Rwanda (7.5; 2.4) Angola (7.9; 2.8)
DRC Congo (0.0; 2.8) Malawi (3.2; 2.3) Cap-Vert (6.5; 2.4) Equatorial Guinea (20.9; 2.3)
2 to 2.9% Comoros (2.0; 2.6) Sao Tomé and Principe Senegal (4.6; 2.4) Nigeria (4.0; 2.2)
Kenya (2.8; 2.2) (3.1; 2.3) Ghana (4.7; 2.1)
Guinea-Conakry Mozambique (8.4; 2.0)
(3.6; 2.2) Tanzania (5.4; 2.0)
Ivory Coast (1.5; 1.6) Zambia (3.6; 1.7)
1 to 1.9% Liberia (-8.7*; 1.4) Namibia (4.0; 1.4) Cameroon (4.5; 1.9) Sudan (6.4; 1.9)
Central African Republic South Africa (3.1; 0.8) Mauritius (4.9; 1.0) Gabon (1.7; 1.7)
(0.9; 1.3)
Seychelles (2.0; 0.9)
Less than 1% Zimbabwe (-2.4; 0.6) Botswana (5.7; 0.1)
Swaziland (2.8; 0.2)
Lesotho (2.7; 0.1)
Source: World Bank (2006) ; United Nations (2005).
* For the 2000-2004 period. The data for the 1996-2000 period is unavailable.
Note: The first number in brackets is the economic growth rate, the second number in brackets is the population growth rate in the respective periods.
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